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Reforming the Role of Magistrates: Implications for Summary Justice in England and Wales 
Jane C. Donoghue 
 
 
Abstract 
The role of lay magistrates in England and Wales has been progressively undermined by protracted 
processes of reform over the last two decades. Current government proposals aim to reorient and 
‘strengthen’ their function through the creation of new magisterial responsibilities such as oversight 
of out of court disposals and greater involvement with local justice initiatives. This article argues that 
while these proposals embody necessary and important areas for reform, taken in isolation they will 
fail to consolidate the role of magistrates in summary justice unless they are enacted alongside other 
measures which aim to reaffirm the status of lay justices, and which seek to reverse the trend which 
has prioritised administrative efficiency at the expense of lay justice. Rapidly declining magistrate 
numbers together with continuous (and continuing) programs of court closures are irreconcilable 
with the future viability of a lay magistracy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The English and Welsh legal system is highly distinctive in comparison with many other jurisdictions 
in its use of ‘lay’ (non-professional) justices in the magistrates’ courts.1 Over the last fifteen years in 
particular, however, there has been significant political and legal debate about the function and 
rationale of lay participation in summary justice.2 Recognition of the central role played by local 
communities appears to receive continued support from government. However, in light of the 
constraints associated with depleted case loads, court closures, reduction in magistrate numbers, 
increasing case complexity and substantial criminal justice budget cutbacks, government ministers 
have stressed the importance of reforming the role of magistrates in order to provide legitimacy for 
their continued existence as a feature of the legal system in years to come.3 Government reforms 
aim to reorient and expand the function of lay justices and include proposals for new magisterial 
responsibilities such as oversight of out of court disposals; justices’ hearing certain types of cases 
individually rather than sitting as a bench of three; the creation of specialised traffic courts; and 
plans for more systematic engagement with communities through direct involvement with local 
projects and initiatives such as neighbourhood justice panels.4 Current government plans for 
reforming the role of magistrates clearly envisage that their revised function will enhance ‘efficiency’ 
in the court process and result in considerable cost savings.5 Fiscal imperatives have meant that 
administrative efficiency has been a central theme of proposals for change in the criminal justice 
system in recent years. The government’s 2012 White Paper Swift and Sure Justice, placed particular 
emphasis upon more ‘efficient’ and ‘reliable’ delivery of criminal justice to ‘enhance public 
confidence’, which it intends to achieve through practical changes to the justice system including 
increased use of technology, longer court opening times, early guilty pleas, and changes to the role 
of magistrates.6 As the drive towards efficiency savings continues apace, reflected in court closures 
and increasing centralisation, the government is placing renewed emphasis upon the need for the 
magistracy to improve and to demonstrate efficiency in the delivery of summary justice. 
A national consultation on Reforming the Role of Magistrates was launched by the Ministry of Justice 
in August 2013 which outlined proposals for magistrates to become further involved in summary 
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processes.7 These proposals are important because the volume of cases that magistrates hear has 
been steadily declining, with a 14 per cent reduction in court business over the last four years.8 This 
is in part a consequence of the significant increase in police use of out of court disposals. While the 
diversion of low-level offences from the formal court process is useful in providing greater speed, 
efficiency and proportionality in responses to low-level offending, many cautions and other 
summary disposals have been used for more serious types of offences such as assault and burglary, 
as well as for persistent offenders. This has undermined the role of the magistrates’ court as the 
court of first response, and has displaced business which ought rightfully to be the preserve of the 
magistrates’ courts, to the police. There is also ineffective scrutiny of police decision-making in 
relation to the use of summary penalties and the opportunity to challenge the issuing of these 
disposals is heavily circumscribed. Moreover, cautions for assault, for example, are not counted in 
official crime statistics, which impacts on data on (and perceptions of) the crime rate. 
In addition, there has been a decrease of more than 20 per cent in the number of sitting magistrates 
since 2011 as well as the closure of many courthouses across the country.9 This has coincided with 
an increase in the number of professional District Judges, who also hear cases in the magistrates’ 
courts, and an expansion in the judicial and quasi-judicial powers of legally qualified Justices’ Clerks, 
who advise magistrates. Increasing professionalisation in the magistrates’ courts stands in 
opposition to the central tenets of a summary justice system underpinned by the notion of lay 
justice, delivered by members of the citizenry. The government’s proposals for reform come at a 
time when magistrates are increasingly concerned that their role in summary justice is 
fundamentally under threat. Against the backdrop of the government’s 2013 consultation on 
reforming the role of magistrates, in this article I will examine the genesis and theoretical 
significance of lay participation in summary justice in England and Wales. I argue that the laity is an 
intrinsically valuable institution because the role of magistrates is an embodiment of society in the 
legal process which exists as a direct democratisation of that process. Moreover, lay magistrates 
possess distinct technocratic advantages as well as providing an important check on professional 
power. Economic considerations are also relevant and I contend that the relative financial merits of 
the lay magistracy, taken together with democratic arguments, provide the combination of elements 
most worthy of consideration in the conceptual framework of the value of magistrates’ participation 
in summary justice. 
In the second part of the article, I examine the ways in which the delivery of magistrates’ ‘local 
justice’ has progressively been undermined by protracted processes of reform over several decades. 
I then analyse the impact of proposals for reform in three domains of particular significance: out of 
court disposals; neighbourhood justice panels; and sentencing jurisdiction and supervision. I argue 
that these embody necessary and important areas for reform. Taken in isolation, however, they will 
fail to consolidate the role of magistrates in summary justice unless they are enacted alongside other 
measures which aim to strengthen and reaffirm the status and autonomy of lay justices, and which 
seek to reverse the trend which has paradoxically emphasised retaining the principle of local justice, 
while increasing centralisation in the administration and management of magistrates’ courts. I 
conclude that current policy proposals collectively fail to recognise that rapidly declining magistrate 
numbers together with continuous (and continuing) programs of court closures are irreconcilable 
with the future viability of the lay magistracy. The government’s proposed reforms will do little to 
strengthen the role of magistrates if they take place in a policy vacuum. 
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THE LAY MAGISTRACY 
The lay magistracy is one of the oldest legal institutions in England and Wales.10 Magistrates have 
been commissioned to keep the peace since 1195, with their role subsequently becoming formalised 
in the Justices of the Peace Act 1361, which devolved power to members of the community to 
administer justice. The lay magistracy is thus composed of unsalaried volunteer members of the 
general public who sit as part-time judges, known as Justices of the Peace (JPs), in the magistrates’ 
court in England and Wales.11 District Judges (DJs) also hear cases in the magistrates’ court. These 
are full-time, salaried members of the judiciary who usually deal with longer and more complex 
cases coming before the court.12 Lay magistrates sit across adult, youth and family courts, which 
hear around 97 per cent of criminal cases in England and Wales.13 Magistrates decide on matters of 
fact and law, and so they perform both the functions of judge and jury that are undertaken in the 
Crown Court. Legal advice is provided to magistrates, when required, by the Justices’ Clerk.14 
Magistrates hear a broad spectrum of cases including less serious criminal cases such as motoring 
offences, and failure to pay council tax/TV licences but they also deal with cases at the more serious 
end of the range of criminality such as causing death by aggravated vehicle taking, assaults, sexual 
offences, drug offences, frauds, theft and burglaries. For a single criminal offence committed by an 
adult, magistrates have the power to impose a period of not more than six months in custody (or a 
total of 12 months for multiple offences). Their sentencing powers also include the imposition of 
fines up to £5,000 and community penalties. Over 80 per cent of cases in the magistrates’ court 
involve guilty pleas; therefore magistrates’ work is predominantly concerned with sentencing rather 
than determining innocence or guilt.15 
Although the value of a lay magistracy as an embodiment of citizen participation in justice is a 
cornerstone of the philosophical underpinnings of the magistracy in England and Wales,16 there has 
been a significant reduction in the number of sitting magistrates in recent years, from over 30,000 
justices in 2011,17 to approximately 23, 000 magistrates in 2013.18 Nonetheless, legal and political 
commentators continue to observe the important symbolic role that the lay magistracy embodies 
within the English legal system.19 The former Lord Chief Justice, the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, 
described the lay magistracy as a ‘democratic jewel beyond price’.20 Historically, there has also 
been recognition by politicians of the central role that lay participants play in the delivery of justice 
to local communities.21 In 2000, a report commissioned by the Home Office, The Judiciary in the 
Magistrates’ Courts, observed that: ‘Successive governments . . .have favoured the encouragement 
of active citizens or of an active community. The lay magistracy, whatever its imperfections, is a 
manifestation of those concepts’.22 
Given the fundamental significance of the lay magistracy to the English legal tradition, it is therefore 
surprising that lay participation in magistrates’ courts lacks a clear conceptual framework within 
existing legal scholarship. Discussion on the merits of lay participation has tended to coalesce 
around empirically untested assumptions that, for example, lay justices enhance public confidence, 
and a priori arguments that ‘lay judges are good in themselves’.23 This lack of clarity in theorising lay 
justice is problematic because the absence of a sound conceptual basis for magistrates’ participation 
limits the cohesiveness of arguments favouring the retention of lay justice and fails to provide a 
coherent justification for the magistracy in the current climate of criminal justice reform. In the 
sections that follow, I endeavour to unpick and evaluate the disparate conceptual trajectories and 
values which frame lay participation in summary justice and I set out the theoretical parameters of 
lay justice around which current discussions about reforms to the role of magistrates ought to be 
structured. 
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THEORISING LAY JUSTICE 
Democratic legitimacy 
Within the existing literature, the concept of lay justice has frequently been viewed as being 
underpinned by, or identified with, theories of democratic legitimacy and democratic participation. 
The delivery of justice by the collaboration of lay people is intended to represent a model of ‘true’ 
democracy wherein the citizenry is actively engaged in key spheres of decision-making.24 In 
particular, commentators have stressed the importance of lay justice as a democratic safeguard 
against professional power. The dominance of professional power in the form of ‘expert’ knowledge 
and discourse has to date received much attention across the study of various professional 
domains.25 Within legal contexts specifically, scholars have notably observed that the collective 
effect of rules and formal procedures might tend towards signifying a ‘conspiracy against the laity’ 
whereby complexity and formality isolate the public, obfuscate the legal process, and further 
entrench notions that the process(es) of justice are exclusive, remote and administered by an elite 
professional class.26 It is envisaged, therefore, that lay participation can serve to counteract 
lawyers’ ‘mystification of their trade’.27 This view is predicated on the notion that the laity is seen to 
be ‘free of the habits of thought, speech and bearing which characterise professional lawyers’, and 
that magistrates simultaneously operate with ‘a sound, practical understanding of what the law is 
and how it works’,28 thereby protecting the administration of justice from becoming the esoteric 
preserve of lawyers.29 
Anglo-American legal scholars have, moreover, scrutinised the epistemic foundations of legal 
education and training,30 and have sought to identify the ways in which lawyers’ training gives them 
distinctive professional values (and biases) which may inculcate ‘a narrow, professionally inflected 
perspective on central contention of those who advocate lay magistrate participation that the laity 
can provide a degree of counter-balance in the administration of summary justice through heuristic 
skills and expertise that are not framed by traditional legal education and training.33 However, it is a 
common criticism of magistrates that because they lack this legal education and training, they are 
relatively poorly equipped to interpret and apply the law. This view, as Ingman rightly observes, 
misunderstands the magistrates’ function in the judicial process. Clearly, a lay justice cannot equal 
the professional skill of a judge, but the role of the lay justice is largely to decide questions of fact, 
and in doing so ‘to exercise common sense and sound judgment’.34 Thus, ‘the duty to act judicially 
and impartially with an appreciation of the basics of legal procedures and evidence is, in the case of 
lay magistrates, far more important than the acquisition of a detailed knowledge of substantive law’. 
Closely analogous, are the suppositions that lay magistrates possess distinct technocratic advantages 
in that they contribute to the functioning of a system with greater democratic accountability 
through, in particular, reduced bias in decision-making. Judicial decision-making that is undertaken 
by a lay bench as opposed to a single judge may provide greater transparency and accountability in 
outcomes through minimising errors across cases.35 These arguments too have a considerable 
historical legacy. Writing on the future of the lay magistracy in this journal nearly 70 years ago, 
Chorley observed, 
A momentary lack of concentration or inattentiveness may vitiate the whole process. The 
unpaid magistrates’ court with its rota of several justices is not subject to this defect. It is 
true, of course, that the great bulk of . . . work does not provide cases where the decision 
can be open to doubt, but it is just the doubtful case when it goes wrong which rankles the 
victim, and brings into existence a social sore.36 
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The notion of the lay magistracy as a tool for achieving greater transparency in summary justice 
continues to be widely propagated by advocates of the laity and the potential for magistrates’ justice 
to provide greater accountability in outcomes across cases remains a powerful consideration.37 
District Judges are indeed quicker in their disposal of cases because they are employed full-time and 
sit alone rather than as a bench of three; hence the decision-making process is expedited by the 
absence of the need for discussion. While this can be advantageous since they are legally trained 
professionals and therefore spend less time seeking advice from the clerk, and District Judges may 
also be better able to curtail excessive advocacy,38 a lay bench, as opposed to a single judge, may be 
less subject to the risk of subjective bias and/or errors in decision-making.39 Jackson and Doran, 
amongst others, provide evidence that years of service as a professional judge can lead to the 
cultivation of stereotypes concerning the personality of defendants, their background, and the 
supposed circumstances in which offences are usually committed.40 They suggest that these 
stereotypes can in turn interfere with the right of defendants to be tried only on the basis of 
evidence, and thus prevent judges from taking a fresh and impartial view of each case.41 While not 
a panacea to the problems associated with subjective bias in judicial decision-making, there is 
nonetheless evidence to suggest that the part-time nature of magistrates’ work may go some way 
towards limiting their ‘cohesiveness’ in the court process, which can provide an important safeguard 
against the formation of ‘clique’ based mentalities and case-hardening.42 
 
Local justice 
The notion of democratic legitimacy should also be understood as existing concomitantly with the 
concept of local justice. Through the local justice model, it is intended that magistrates ‘bring 
common sense and knowledge of the locality and the local community to the criminal justice 
process.’43 Magistrates have historically been drawn from the communities and surrounding areas 
in which they live and work. This has not been so for the appointment of District Judges who are 
appointed by Royal Warrant upon recommendation by the Lord Chancellor and are assigned to one 
of seven bench regions across England and Wales.44 Therefore, it has typically been intended that 
magistrates possess greater local knowledge than their District Judge counterparts, who have a 
nation-wide commission. 
The concept of geographically sensitive justice is disconcertingly vague, but this notion of a lay 
‘bench ethos’ can be constructed by what Pat Carlen calls a ‘mass of situationally evolved 
knowledge’.45 In Paul v DPP,46 for example, magistrates used their local knowledge in deciding a 
kerb-crawling case. There was no evidence that P’s activities had caused a nuisance to local 
residents, as required by the Criminal Justice Act 1985. However, the justices used their local 
knowledge that the area was a residential and densely populated locale to provide the missing 
element in the prosecution’s case. Woolf LJ observed on appeal that this was an instance where 
magistrates’ local knowledge had been useful. In Norbrook Laboratories v Health & Safety 
Executive,47 it was held that justices may rely upon local knowledge but that magistrates should 
disclose whenever they proposed to take judicial notice of local knowledge to enable the parties to 
comment and/or call evidence on the matters in question.48 Differentiating personal knowledge 
from local knowledge, the court made clear in Carter v Eastbourne Borough Council,49 that 
magistrates ought not to make use of their personal knowledge and experience of the world in place 
of evidence. Thus it is legitimate for local knowledge to be relied upon by magistrates where justices 
have a closer acquaintance with the issues raised in a particular case as a consequence of that 
knowledge, however they must inform parties of the intention to use this knowledge in their judicial 
reasoning. 
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Empirical scholarship suggests that judges’ knowledge about local community contexts and crime 
problems can help to improve judicial decision-making and can assist professionals in making more 
nuanced decisions about both treatment needs and the risks individual defendants pose to public 
safety, ensuring offenders receive an appropriate level of supervision and services.50 This might 
include, for example, knowledge of local economies, social demographics and cultures, as well as the 
availability and infrastructure of local treatment and support services, unemployment levels and the 
prevalence of various types of offences. Many defendants who appear before the magistrates’ 
courts have addiction and mental health problems for example. By linking offenders to local, 
individually tailored community-based services (for example job training, drug treatment, safety 
planning, mental health counselling) where appropriate, the local justice system can help reduce 
recidivism, improve community safety and enhance confidence in justice.51 Links to local services 
can also aid victims, improving their safety and helping restore their lives.52 Local justice is therefore 
conceptualised as integral to rehabilitating offenders through developing pathways to support their 
reintegration back into their community. 
To what extent local knowledge may be prejudicial to fairness in decision-making and case outcomes 
is a matter of some contention. It is a fundamental tenet of the rule of law that like cases be treated 
alike and there have been well-articulated concerns that a focus on ‘local’ decision-making may lead 
to inconsistency in sentencing, which has been an area of debate among legal commentators for 
some time.53 In response, significant efforts have been made to address this issue, through in 
particular the introduction of sentencing guidelines and improved training for magistrates.54 These 
have been important developments in improving magistrates’ competency across a range of 
different case types.55 Magistrates are bound by the rules of the legal system, court procedure and 
sentencing guidelines. Local justice need not therefore undermine judicial independence or 
sentence consistency. In subscribing to the notion local justice, it is possible to remain devoted to 
the principles of unbiased, detached adjudication conducted by third party neutrals while at the 
same time valuing decision-makers who understand community issues and who are well-placed to 
incorporate local knowledge where appropriate, and consistently with the rule of law. 
While local justice should not be understood as standing ‘in opposition’ to a more universal or 
substantive approach to justice, the conceptual argument that lay magistrates should be retained 
because they reflect local justice, is now less persuasive. Changes to the structure and 
administration of magistrates’ courts in recent years have dramatically reduced opportunities for the 
delivery of genuinely ‘local justice’ in the communities that magistrates serve. For example, prior to 
2003 magistrates were required to live within 15 miles of the area in which they worked. Following 
the introduction of the Courts Act 2003, no such requirement now exists. The vast number of 
courthouse closures has meant that many magistrates no longer live near the court in which they sit, 
resulting in a reduction in magistrates’ knowledge of local areas and local crime problems. The most 
recent program of court mergers and closures in 2012 led to a significant reduction in the number of 
Local Justice Areas (LJAs).56 The Senior Presiding Judge, Lord Justice Goldring, has since stated that 
every magistrate must be prepared to sit anywhere in their LJA if required. The distances between 
courthouses can be daunting and, outside of London, can reach distances of nearly 80 miles 
between courts in the same LJA. The importance and value attached to local justice appears to have 
been reduced as national consistency has increased. Greater centralisation risks removing the 
‘community’ dimension from the majority of criminal cases,57 and in turn undermining the 
fundamental principle of the lay bench as ‘a democratic bridge between the community and the 
legal system’.58 
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The closure of many local courthouses may, on the one hand, be seen as a challenge to the 
legitimacy of the local justice argument but, on the other, may also suggest that the composition of 
a bench of three lay justices (in the absence of a jury) is even more critical if we are to retain a 
summary justice system which continues to value significant lay participation, especially considering 
only 12 per cent of charges are decided by jury deliberation at Crown Court.59 Although the 
parameters of local justice have been circumscribed, advocates contend that lay adjudication 
continues to exemplify direct democratisation of the justice process, embodying ‘the political right 
of citizens to participate meaningfully in their judicial systems’.60 Decision-making is conferred upon 
a greater range of perspectives and community voices, and in this way may act as a bulwark against 
the danger of executive influence.61 In this regard, it is important to examine to what extent the 
laity’s claims to representativeness are empirically grounded. 
 
Representativeness 
Historically, a significant limitation of the democratic legitimacy of the lay magistracy has been its 
claims to representativeness. Majority social groups, most notably white, middle-class professionals, 
have been over-represented in the magistracy, inevitably inviting the criticism that lay participation 
is not inclusive or indeed fundamentally democratic. In response to these concerns, considerable 
efforts have been undertaken in recent years to achieve, in particular, a more representative ethnic 
balance within the laity. In 2003, the magistrates’ National Recruitment Strategy involved a number 
of initiatives aimed at encouraging young people and minority ethnic groups to become involved in 
the judicial process.62 Application and interview procedures were streamlined, there are no longer 
political appointments, and JPs are not required to be citizens of the country in which they officiate. 
Subsequent studies have found that de-gentrification of the lay magistracy has achieved some 
progress in this regard.63 However, while the current composition of the lay magistracy is gender 
balanced and ethnically representative at the national level, approximately half of serving 
magistrates are over the age of 60. A primary obstacle in enhancing diversity remains the discovery 
and recruitment of a sufficient and appropriate range of candidates for appointment. 
While the criteria for, and the mechanics of, magistrates’ appointment has been reformed to reflect 
diversification objectives, there remain additional important barriers to participation, most notably 
with regard to obtaining agreement from employers for the requisite time off from work to meet the 
requirements for minimum sitting days. Although there is a legal duty upon employers to allow 
workers reasonable time off work to perform their duties as a magistrate, 64 how much time the 
employee is entitled to will depend on what is reasonable in the circumstances depending on how 
much time away from work the employee has already been permitted for other purposes (such as 
holidays) and the effect of the employee’s absence on the employer’s business.65 There is also no 
express duty upon an employer to pay an employee during the time taken off to serve as a 
magistrate. This has led to reduced participation from groups who are unable to obtain the requisite 
time away from their employment and has particularly impacted upon individuals who work in 
teaching and nursing professions; those who work part-time; and/or individuals who cannot afford 
to take unpaid absence from employment.66 Collectively, these limitations serve to undermine the 
argument that lay justice is truly representative, although it is nonetheless considerably more 
representative than other parts of the judiciary. 
To what extent the current composition of the magistracy impacts upon (or increases) public 
confidence is an issue which lacks a reliable evidence base. Assertions that the existence of the lay 
magistracy is, in and of itself, sufficient to enhance public confidence in summary justice are not 
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well-founded. However, there is evidence to suggest that magistrates do in fact attract greater 
confidence than professional judges, as well as professionals in other areas of the criminal justice 
system. A Ministry of Justice Report published in 2010, which collates data from the British Crime 
Surveys (since renamed the Crime Survey for England and Wales) from 2002–2003 to 2007–2008, 
found that public confidence in magistrates was much higher than professionals in other areas such 
as probation, prisons, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), and judges, with the exception of the 
police.67 The data should also be considered in the context of increasing levels of confidence in 
magistrates: there was a five per cent increase in public confidence in their performance between 
2002–2003 and 2007–2008.68 
Thus while there is more to be done in terms of achieving a genuinely representative balance within 
the lay magistracy,69 significant reforms have been undertaken in recent years in response to 
concerns about its composition. Rather than existing as an archaic, historical anomaly within the 
English legal system, the magistracy has demonstrated that it has the capacity for change and 
adaption; that it will initiate processes of self-accounting and operate reflexively; and that it is willing 
to engage with modernisation to enable it to continue to function as a contemporary democratic 
institution. Yet it is remarked with some regularity that the laity is indeed a ‘traditional’ institution, 
and tradition remains a central conceptual argument for some who advocate the retention of 
magistrates’ justice. Lucia Zedner has echoed the observations of many other legal commentators in 
expressing the view that the lay magistracy is ‘probably best explained as a historical legacy that 
would be an unlikely feature of a modern, rationally conceived system’.70 In this regard, the 
continued existence of the magistracy is viewed as serving a pragmatic purpose within the criminal 
justice system, but one which is conceptually anomalous. That the lay magistracy is important for 
reasons of tradition is undoubtedly the weakest conceptual argument for its retention: the rationale 
for lay justice requires much more substantive theoretical justification than simply evidence of its 
historical legacy. 
Instead, reflecting on the principal conceptual trajectories and values which frame lay participation 
in summary justice, the theoretical basis for the retention of the lay magistracy may best be 
constructed around the notion of a commitment to participatory democracy. The value of the lay 
magistracy emanates from both its symbolic democratic properties and its instrumental capacity and 
technocratic advantages. The administration of lay justice can assist in counteracting problems 
associated with case hardening and may go some way to subverting the domination of professional 
values and biases in summary justice by providing skills and ‘court-craft’ abilities that are not framed 
by traditional legal education and training.71 Although there are limits upon its claims to genuine 
social representativeness, the magistracy is undoubtedly closer to the ideal of trial by one’s peers 
than can be achieved by professional judges ‘whose background, socio-economic circumstances and 
lifestyle is more radically different from the defendants and witnesses appearing before them’.72 
Lay participation disrupts the notion that law is the preserve of exclusivist professional institutions 
(and the state) and advances the idea that law functions and is applied ‘across, through, beyond and 
even on the far side’ of those same institutions.73 The symbolic significance of allowing laypeople to 
decide matters of fact and law ‘reveals a society at home with the notion that law and rights are 
changeless truths discoverable by lawyers and laypeople alike’.74 In this context, ‘law is a fact like 
any other: all that is necessary for the resolution of a dispute is for people of good character, free 
from the temptations of corruption, to apply their minds to it diligently and impartially’. 
However, given the current fiscal climate and government plans for reform, democratic legitimacy 
alone would not seem to be a sufficiently persuasive conceptual grounding for magistrates’ 
retention. There are in addition economic considerations which may lend further support to the 
9 
 
retention of lay justice. The Home Office commissioned report on The Judiciary in the Magistrates’ 
Courts, which was the first study to examine this issue, found that on average magistrates were 12 
per cent less expensive than District Judges.75 A further study in 2011 initially suggested that 
magistrates were significantly cheaper than DJs, but concluded that when ‘volunteer costs’ (that is, 
‘the cost to the wider economy as a result of magistrates volunteering [which] reflects the “value” of 
their unpaid time’) were included, magistrates were found to be more expensive than DJs for most 
cases.76 However, this analysis was subsequently identified as methodologically weak because 
many magistrates are retired and so their time cannot be monetised. In response to this criticism, 
the Ministry of Justice undertook a revised cost based analysis, the results of which were published 
in December 2013.77 The new calculations suggest that DJs are at least twice as expensive as 
magistrates.78 The cost for a summary non-motoring case, for example, is £18 per case for 
magistrates and £55 per case for DJs.79 Moreover, the study did not control for DJs’ increased use of 
custody when compared to magistrates, therefore the ultimate cost of their work to the criminal 
justice system is likely to be higher still.80 This evidence needs to be understood in the context of a 
four per cent rise in the number of DJs since 2008, which at the same time, corresponds to an overall 
reduction in magistrate numbers of more than 20 per cent. That magistrates are, in practical terms, 
more financially efficient, taken together with democratic arguments, likely provides the 
combination of elements most worthy of consideration in the conceptual framework of magistrates’ 
participation in summary justice. The second part of this article will now critically examine the 
theoretical parameters of lay justice in the context of current discussions about reforms to the role 
of magistrates. 
 
THE EROSION OF LAY JUSTICE 
The status of the lay magistracy has been subject to significant scrutiny and reform particularly over 
the last two decades. In 1992, overall responsibility for the administration of magistrates’ courts was 
assumed by the Lord Chancellor. A government White Paper, A New Framework for Local Justice, 
followed in the same year which outlined, amongst other reforms, government plans to alter the 
relationship between the lay magistracy and their legally qualified clerks.81 At this time, a number of 
reservations were expressed that the proposals would undermine the administration of justice and 
would impact upon the independence of the magistracy by centralising power in the hands of the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department.82 Nevertheless, the White Paper resulted in a number of changes 
which were introduced by the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994. These reforms considerably 
altered the existing landscape of magistrates’ courts’ administration. In particular, the number of 
magistrates’ courts committees was significantly reduced. Magistrates’ courts committees, which 
had been created by The Justices of the Peace Act 1949, functioned as local management boards 
which possessed a purely administrative function. The 1994 Act brought about a process of 
amalgamation whereby the committees’ responsibilities for specific courts was more clearly defined, 
and power was conferred on the Lord Chancellor to combine committee areas and to direct 
committees as to their standards of performance. 
These reforms coincided with statutory changes in the role of the Justices’ Clerk (who act as legally 
trained advisors to magistrates). Their judicial powers had steadily been expanded during this period 
through the delegation of (what were traditionally) magistrates’ functions to the Justices’ Clerk, 
resulting in a blurring of the advisory and judicial role.83 The increasing number of judicial and 
quasi-judicial powers conferred upon Justices’ Clerks coincided with a contraction in the role of 
magistrates, representing a (tacit) movement towards greater professionalisation of the magistracy 
and a reduction in the role of lay justices. Increasing professionalisation undermines the notion of 
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summary justice delivered by volunteer members of the community and erodes the important 
overarching principles associated with lay justice. If greater professionalisation is a goal of reforms, 
this ought to be stated as an objective, rather than achieved by changes that displace and 
undermine lay participation. 
Following the election of the Labour administration in 1997, further change was afoot. The 
government articulated its desire to ameliorate management structures and improve efficiency 
within the criminal justice system at both national and local levels.84 While magistrates had been 
responsible for the administrative management of their own courts, they were increasingly subject 
to greater oversight by the Lord Chancellor’s Department. A total of 42 Magistrates’ Courts 
Committees managed the whole court system, which comprised 430 local courts disposing of 
2,000,000 criminal cases annually, totalling 95 per cent of all cases coming before the criminal 
courts. They were by far the largest element in the criminal justice system and it was this aspect of 
the administration of the magistrates’ courts that received particular attention in the Labour 
government’s commissioned review of the criminal courts, undertaken by Sir Robin Auld.85 The 
financial affairs and especially the auditing/accounting procedures of Magistrates’ Courts 
Committees were described as unsatisfactory. Moreover, Sir Robin observed that, despite increasing 
oversight by the Lord Chancellor’s Department, there were ‘considerable differences’ in the 
operation of Magistrates’ Courts Committees across the country, since each possessed responsibility 
for developing their own procedures and their own forms of implementing legislation and 
government policy, thus making consistency in court practices very difficult to achieve.86 
The Labour government’s response to the Auld Report was wholesale reform of the administration 
of magistrates’ courts, aimed at increasing ‘efficiency’ and reducing inconsistency in court policies 
and practices. Following the enactment of the Courts Act 2003, Magistrates’ Court Committees 
which previously operated autonomously from the civil service, were abolished in 2005 and replaced 
with a centralised administrative body (Her Majesty’s Courts Service).87 The Act also established 
District Judges in the magistrates’ courts, replacing what were previously referred to as stipendiary 
magistrates. The powers of Justices’ Clerks were further expanded to include functions that would 
ordinarily be considered judicial, such as the issuing of an arrest warrant and the discharging of the 
accused where the prosecution offers no evidence.88 Although there was significant parliamentary 
support for the reforms, again a number of reservations were well expressed, this time concerning 
the abolition of Magistrates’ Court Committees, and whether such significant reforms to the 
magistracy were necessary and appropriate.89 While efforts to improve consistency in the work of 
magistrates’ courts rightly required attention, greater administrative consistency could have been 
achieved without wholesale centralisation. Improved magistrates’ training and the introduction of 
sentencing guidelines, for example, have both been important in promoting consistency.90 Yet these 
could have been implemented instead of a process of magistrates’ courts centralisation, and as part 
of a series of reforms which sought to retain the principle of local justice, rather than which 
ultimately undermined it. 
Increased centralisation is but one development in a broader trend over a number of decades which 
has seen the magistracy stripped of many of its powers in respect of the administration and control 
of magistrates’ courts, and which has been accompanied by an unremitting program of court 
closures, a significant reduction in the number of sitting magistrates, and the increasing 
marginalisation of JPs within the summary justice system. A crucial observation here is that court 
closures and increased centralisation (including magistrates’ oversight by the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department) had been a consistent feature of summary justice for decades, and indeed long before 
the publication of the Auld Report in 2001. We should recognise therefore that while current plans 
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for reform have been precipitated by economic decline and government requirements for ‘efficiency 
savings’,91 the reduction in the scope and significance of magistrates’ work has been a feature of 
policy and practice on summary justice for many years. As a consequence, magistrates’ courts have 
come to exist as part of a centralised bureaucracy. This is dangerous because it has led to 
magistrates’ autonomy being circumscribed, and to the encroachment on and domination of 
summary justice processes and principles by the executive. 
 
CURRENT PLANS FOR REFORM 
Further changes to the lay magistracy are now being considered as a consequence of the Coalition 
government’s drive to increase ‘efficiency’ in the magistrates’ courts, resulting from current fiscal 
imperatives and the need to reduce expenditure in the criminal justice system more broadly. In 
2012, the government’s White Paper Swift and Sure Justice, set out proposals for single magistrates 
to deal with low-level, uncontested cases such as shoplifting and criminal damage offences, where 
the defendant has been charged with the offence and a guilty plea is anticipated.92 There followed, 
on 14 August 2013, a speech to launch the Ministry of Justice’s consultation, Reforming the Role of 
Magistrates, given by the Minister for Justice, Damian Green, in which he explained that the 
government was currently ‘exploring new roles for magistrates in cutting crime locally, for example 
by scrutinising the police’s use of out of court disposals (such as cautions)’, and in engaging with the 
local community through community justice oriented initiatives.93 Under these proposals, an 
estimated 0.8 million regulatory cases such as TV licence evasion and motoring offences are 
expected to be dealt with by a single magistrate. An Impact Assessment has recently been published 
which identifies both monetised and non-monetised impacts of this proposed reform, although it 
does not assess the possible behavioural response of defendants seeking to have ‘their day in 
court’.94 
While the logic of the proposed reforms to regulatory cases appears relatively obvious since cases 
that are proved in absence rarely contain details that warrant significant discussion across the bench 
(particularly TV license offences), these arrangements may not be universally fair for written pleas or 
for other types of cases where a discussion about the circumstances could be called for. The bench 
of three magistrates is an important check on fairness and moderation to ensure consistency, and 
which may now be affected. It should not be overlooked that sentences in motoring cases can have 
a very serious impact upon an individual’s livelihood. The erosion of local justice through court 
closures means that the importance of magistrates’ local knowledge in dealing with such cases will, 
inevitably, be much more limited. Historically, magistrates who sat on traffic cases were familiar 
with the routes and roads where minor road offences were committed, and so were able to provide 
some perspective on the defendant’s mitigation. Unfortunately, many fewer magistrates now 
possess this local knowledge when hearing traffic cases. Indeed, the reduction in magistrates’ local 
knowledge has a corresponding impact on a whole host of other case types, where an understanding 
of local cultures and demographics, as well as more specific knowledge about the contexts of crime, 
including opportunity for and prevalence of various types of offences, can be instructive. Moreover, 
the introduction of these proposals will reduce the number of magistrates required for court work 
still further. While the Impact Assessment estimates that that the change will achieve savings of 
between £49 and £67 million, it makes no mention of the impact upon JP numbers despite, 
somewhat abstrusely, acknowledging government work to ‘strengthen the role of magistrates’.95 
In common with previous government policy reforms, there is a continued emphasis upon retaining 
the principle of local justice, with the paradoxical objective of extending local benches to cover 
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larger areas.96 It is difficult to reconcile the implications of these reforms with the ability of 
magistrates’ to delivery genuinely local justice. Yet government reforms simultaneously intend to 
place ‘the magistrate at the heart of the criminal justice system in their communities’ and to involve 
magistrates in ‘cutting crime locally’ through, for example magistrates scrutinising police use of out 
of court disposals, and engaging with local community initiatives. In the following sections, three of 
the most significant potential areas for reform of the magistrates’ role will be critically examined: 
out of court disposals; neighbourhood justice panels; and sentencing (jurisdiction and supervision). 
 
OUT OF COURT DISPOSALS 
Although out of court penalties such as cautions have been in existence for some considerable time, 
it was under the administration of the New Labour government during the late 1990s that there 
began to be a substantial increase in the use of summary, out of court disposals. The range of 
available penalties presently incorporates cautions; fixed penalty notices (FPNs); penalty notices for 
disorder (PNDs); cannabis warnings; youth restorative disposals (YRDs); and conditional cautions.97 
These penalties aimed to address different forms of anti-social conduct and low-risk offending and 
were introduced in a piecemeal fashion. The primary purpose of out of court disposals is to divert a 
significant number of minor and undisputed matters from the court process, thereby resulting in a 
reduction in cases coming to court, while at the same time streamlining prosecutions for contested 
cases and serious offending. 
Although these summary disposals are not criminal convictions, they do carry a number of important 
implications for those who receive them. A simple caution is an admission of guilt and forms part of 
an offender’s criminal record.98 Cautions and conditional cautions may influence how the offender 
is dealt with, should they come to the notice of the police again, and may also be cited in court in 
any subsequent proceedings. Although cautions become immediately spent under the Rehabilitation 
of Offenders Act 1974, they can still be quoted on Standard and Enhanced Disclosure and Barring 
Service (DBS) checks and can therefore be made known to a prospective employer. 
 
Inconsistent and inappropriate use 
In recent years, there has been a very significant expansion in the use of out-of-court summary 
penalties. Since 2003, the number of out-of-court disposals administered each year increased by 135 
per cent from 241,000 in 2003 to 567,000 in 2008, peaking in 2007 at 626,000.99 Although in the 
last five years the number of out of court disposals issued by the police has dropped by 42 per cent, 
out of court disposals still account for one third of all offences brought to justice in England and 
Wales. Correspondingly, the magistrates’ court caseload has fallen by roughly an equivalent amount. 
In so far as the courts are being unburdened from hearing a range of more minor cases, there has 
been reduction in the frequency and number of low level matters before magistrates’ courts. 
However, the courts are nonetheless involved in enforcing the significant number of PNDs that go 
unpaid.100 For example, in 2008, only two fifths of PNDs were paid within the 21 days allowed and 
52 per cent before a fine was registered, resulting in over 84,000 fines originally imposed as PNDs 
being enforced by the courts.101 Thus if the rationale for the use of out of court disposals is to 
reduce court business and enable magistrates to devote their attention to more serious business, 
there appears some irreconcilability here, although the government has not provided any data on 
the associated costs of PND enforcement. 
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The administrative convenience of summary penalties has been accompanied by wide variation in 
their use across police forces, as well as in the frequency with which penalties are applied for certain 
offences. Evidence suggests that cautions have increasingly been used for repeat offenders, and 
penalty notices are often unpaid and unprosecuted.102 While some commentators have suggested 
that concerns about inappropriate use of out of court disposals for more serious offences, especially 
offences involving violence against the person and rape, have been exaggerated, there is clear 
evidence that their use is not being limited to low level criminality. In 2012, for example, 17,000 
assaults were dealt with by way of out of court disposals. Importantly, these disposals are not 
counted in official crime figures. Therefore, in effect, magistrate numbers are being reduced not as a 
consequence of a drop in offences per se, but by a shift in the domain of where certain offences are 
processed, with the police acquiring greater power for deciding the outcome of a broader range of 
offences including assault, burglary, theft and criminal damage, as well as persistent low-level 
offending. 
There is a broad lack of consistency in the use of out of court penalties across police force areas, as 
well as an absence of any standardised supervisory or oversight mechanism. Issuing a police caution 
is dependent on the accused admitting his or her guilt: this raises concerns about equivocal pleas, 
which a court is not allowed to accept. In a speech in 2011, the previous Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Judge, expressed concern about whether the convenience of avoiding the court process altogether 
may lead an offender to admit to something for which he or she would have a defence.103 It may be 
the case that some suspects prefer to make a false admission and accept a caution in order to avoid 
‘going to court’.104 There is also the associated issue of whether those individuals who accept the 
offer of a PND for example, on the basis that it does not form part of a criminal record, are indeed 
fully aware of, and understand, the other implications of acceptance such as consequences for 
foreign travel and future employment. Such ambiguity is, as Andrew Ashworth observes, ‘at best a 
drawback, and at worst capable of leading to injustice’.105 
The potential problematic implications of out of court disposals for victims is also clear: for example, 
there is no provision for the assessment or consideration of a victim impact statement; there is no 
imposition of the victim surcharge for a police caution and no opportunity for the imposition of 
financial recompense for injury or for criminal damage; something which the courts must consider. 
In particular, criticism of the use of out of court disposals has often focussed upon those instances 
when police cautions have been used for offences which are indictable only (such as rape and 
serious assault). Administered in this way, the use of cautions is unlikely to satisfy the principle of 
proportionality of imposition. 106 It follows therefore that the mechanisms of decision-making 
involved in the use of out of court disposals are of central importance. While few would dispute the 
importance of police discretion and the potential value of out of court penalties in providing greater 
speed and efficiency in responses to low-level offending which are of benefit to ‘the police, the 
offender and society at large’,107 there are nonetheless tensions between the administration of 
summary disposals by police, such as cautions which require an admission of guilt, and longstanding 
historic concerns about the role of police in investigating and prosecuting offences, and 
requirements for due process safeguards and procedures.108 Without an appropriate system for 
oversight and appeal, the police are vulnerable to the pressures associated with the discretionary 
decision-making of those professionals who are in direct, regular contact with those committing 
crimes, as well as potential arbitrary and/or inconsistent decision-making.109 
In 2011, the government published a White Paper which set out plans to develop a ‘clear national 
framework for out of court disposals’.110 The Ministry of Justice, in 2013, then produced national 
guidelines for out of court penalties in the form of a one page table setting out offence types, 
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evidential standards, whether an admission of guilt is required and so forth.111 Yet although 
government has expressed concern about the expansion in use of out of court disposals, and has 
introduced a new ‘justice test’ for police to apply when administering summary penalties, together 
with reforms that will remove the availability of cautions being issued for serious offences such as 
rape, manslaughter and robbery, they have also sought to further extend the use of fixed penalty 
notices to include driving without due care and attention. Given that only just over half of all 
detected notifiable offences and indictable offences result in a prosecution or other sanction,112 it 
is the decision-making process itself which merits much further scrutiny together with the 
development of appropriate mechanisms for accountability. 
 
Magisterial oversight function 
At present, formal mechanisms for oversight of out of court disposals provide only limited 
opportunity for review of police decision-making. For example, those wishing to challenge the 
issuing of a caution must make a complaint against the police force involved or to the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). It is also possible for individuals to issue judicial review 
proceedings.113 Yet this can be a costly and high risk strategy and is unlikely to be accessible to all. 
Increasingly, however, out of court disposals are coming to be regarded as processes that require 
judicial scrutiny – and that correspondingly the police, as members of the executive, should not have 
responsibility for processes of oversight and accountability.114 This is particularly the case since 
police use of FPNs is prone to bias as a result of police performance-related targets.115 In R (on the 
application of Stratton) v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police,116 the claimant (S) challenged a 
caution administered to her on the basis that she had not admitted the commission of an offence 
and that she was not warned of the adverse consequences to her. The court observed, obiter, that 
the consequences of a caution were significant, particularly for anyone who might wish to work in 
occupations where a criminal records bureau check would be necessary, and so the ramifications of 
a caution must be fully explained and informed consent given. The offender must be carefully taken 
through the implications set out in the Ministry of Justice’s 2013 guidance Simple Cautions for Adult 
Offenders,117 and a form explaining these must also be signed by the offender.118 The court 
remarked that, while these stipulations ought to act as a safeguard in protecting against the 
arbitrary and inappropriate use of cautions, there exist two further available safeguards: the 
bringing of proceedings by way of judicial review, as well as emerging processes of magisterial 
review. Importantly, the court reflected that the latter system ‘may well be the more efficacious and 
cost effective way of ensuring that the use of cautions is in accordance with law and the public 
interest is protected’.119 
Magisterial oversight of summary penalties has recently begun to take shape. Scrutiny panels for out 
of court disposals have been created in a number of areas across the country. These have been set 
up on a largely ad hoc basis and while they do not provide an appellate function, they aim, through 
working closely with police, to obtain further clarity about the circumstances in which particular 
cases have not been brought to court; to provide greater transparency about police decision-
making; to work towards greater consistency in the use of disposals; and to monitor any departures 
from statutory guidance indicating that cautions should be used primarily for low level non-repeat 
offenders. Scrutiny panels currently provide this important strategic oversight function in only a 
limited number of areas and could reasonably be extended across the country and to a wider 
number of (particularly local) areas. In order for magistrates to effectively communicate to police 
the appropriateness of the use of summary penalties in particular cases, it would also be useful for 
these panels to operate with greater regularity. Although there is now statutory guidance on the use 
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of out of court penalties, this needs to be much better promulgated. Magistrates can play a strategic 
role in helping to disseminate and clarify this information and are well placed to be able to ensure 
accountability, consistency and compliance with sentencing guidelines. An instructive comparison 
can be made with developments that have taken place in relation to hate crime, with the creation 
and broad proliferation across the country of Hate Crime Scrutiny Panels. These scrutiny panels 
review randomly and independently selected finalised cases in order to evaluate case files and make 
recommendations. They identify issues, common themes, and trends in the decision-making 
process, looking in particular at the impact of decision-making on communities. The panels provide 
significant and effective scrutiny of the criminal process and are a model that could similarly be 
utilised for the oversight of summary disposals, with magistrates playing a central role in this 
accountability mechanism. 
The more contentious issue of course, is whether individuals should be able to apply to the 
magistrates’ court for a review of the decision to administer a caution with the power to expunge a 
caution from the record in the event that a caution has been given incorrectly.120 In the current 
financial climate, which is characterised by considerable criminal justice budget cutbacks, the use of 
out of court disposals is likely to take on additional significance as a solution for managing pressures 
on the court system.121 Attention therefore needs to be paid to assessing the proper roles of the 
police, the CPS and the magistrates’ courts and to examining the variation between the policies of 
the police and the various regulatory agencies in relation to diversionary disposals.122 The formal 
introduction of a statutory oversight mechanism at magistrates’ court level for the administration of 
cautions (and potentially other summary penalties), would be an appropriate judicial process in 
which to ensure that these disposals are issued in accordance with the law.123 Moreover, the 
protection of the public interest is also a significant concern: in a system where only 55 per cent of 
detected notifiable offences and indictable offences result in a prosecution or other sanction (22 per 
cent are cautions and nine per cent are dealt with by way of a PND),124 magisterial oversight would 
enhance accountability and go some considerable way to addressing the concern that the growth in 
the use of out of court disposals has led to inconsistencies in their use, in particular for persistent 
and more serious offending. 
 
NEIGHBOURHOOD JUSTICE PANELS 
Neighbourhood Justice Panels (NJPs) (also known as Community Justice Panels or Neighbourhood 
Resolution Panels) are an alternative disposal for first-time, low-level offences that would normally 
attract a reprimand or final warning for young offenders or a caution for adults. They can involve 
both criminal and anti-social incidents and are referred from agencies including police and 
housing/registered social landlords. The Panels are attended by the victim, offender, and anyone 
else affected by the harm. A ‘facilitator’, who is a trained volunteer from the community, and the 
referring agency (for example, the police) are also represented. Outcomes usually involve some form 
of reparation on behalf of the wrongdoer, to make good for the harm caused. The Panels only work 
with offenders who have admitted their guilt and in circumstances where the victim consents to be 
involved. The introduction of NJPs is intended to reduce delay in the criminal process, as well as 
giving the victim a greater ‘voice’ in the criminal justice system.125 Research suggests that for 
wrongdoers, the main motivation for participating in Panels is the opportunity to avoid criminal 
proceedings since NJPs do not result in a criminal record.126 
The first NJPs in England were set up in 2005 in Chard and Ilminster (Somerset). Their introduction 
was a direct consequence of local courthouse closures in the area: magistrates’ courts had recently 
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been removed from the locality and residents felt frustrated by a perceived lack of local justice.127 
Outcomes have to date been very positive with recent figures indicating that some 330 cases have 
been dealt with by the Panel, which has resulted in a reduction in police administration time of 75 
per cent and a recidivism rate for participants of five per cent.128 Following this initial success, NJPs 
were officially trialled in Sheffield, Manchester and Somerset. The Ministry of Justice evaluations of 
these pilots found low re-offending rates of between three and five per cent and victim satisfaction 
rates of over 90 per cent.129 Although there was evidence of low numbers of referrals to the 
schemes at the outset, as well as other implementation problems and resistance by some police 
officers to the new more ‘informal’ arrangements, there were a number of positive outcomes from 
the pilots including reduced delay in processing low level cases.130 In October 2012, the 
government announced, as part of the introduction of its Swift and Sure Justice policy aimed at 
increasing the number of flexible criminal justice pilot schemes across England and Wales, that they 
would be testing the panels in an additional 15 areas.131 
The average length of time between an offence taking place and a sentence being passed in the 
formal criminal justice system is five months, despite most cases not going to trial or being 
uncontested. The administration of cases in NJPs is much quicker and a case can go from referral to 
Panel in two to three weeks.132 Cost is also another significant factor. According to recent figures 
published by the Local Government Association (LGA), the basic cost to police and the CPS of taking 
a criminal damage case to court in Somerset is £612, with a comparable cost to the NJP of 
£163.50.133 That NJPs appear to be quicker, cheaper and more effective ways of delivering 
summary justice for low level offences is at the core of their appeal for government, and for 
communities themselves. While only the 15 identified test areas will form the basis of the 
government evaluation, other areas across the country have also been encouraged to set up their 
own Panels. However, the operation of the Panels varies according to the different locales in which 
they operate. Some Panels only hear cases involving adult victims and offenders, while Panels in 
other areas accept referrals for cases involving young people and children. The range of cases that 
have been brought before NJPs include neighbour disputes, criminal damage, and assault. 
The comparable speed with which NJPs operate however, needs to be carefully balanced alongside 
existing principles of summary justice to ensure that fairness is not jeopardised in the face of 
administrative expediency.134 In particular, it is important that the restorative practices delivered 
by NJPs are of a robust nature. Moreover, there has been no formal statistical evaluation of the 
impact on reoffending to date so any claims about recidivism are preliminary. The introduction of 
NJPs has in part occurred as a response to the closure of magistrates’ courthouses, and in this way, 
they may offer another opportunity or an alternative avenue for the delivery of local justice which is 
potentially cheaper and more effective than the formal court system. However, their creation also 
undoubtedly provokes further issues around fairness in the delivery of justice, especially in respect 
of the tensions between the delivery of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ summary justice, which will now be 
considered in detail. 
 
Role of magistrates in NJPs 
The formal rules and procedures of the magistrates’ courts are important safeguards in the delivery 
of an equitable and procedurally fair system of summary justice. These formal processes appear not 
to be reflected in the work of some other informal modes of dispute resolution that are becoming 
more prevalent in the summary justice system such as youth referral panels. In the delivery of 
summary justice, there is evidence of some degree of polarity in respect of the work of magistrates’ 
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courts – which are bound by the rules of the legal system, court procedure and sentencing 
guidelines – and, on the other hand, referral panels and local justice panels which, because they are 
not part of the formal justice system, do not operate according to the same legal constraints. 
Balancing the rights of the offender against the rights of victims is a difficult task that has been 
carried out in the past by the judiciary acting within the constraints of the law and court procedure. 
It is important to examine to what extent those same constraints exist for NJPs and to what extent 
they could be exploited by residents for reasons of prejudice or as a result of local disputes based on 
malicious rumour or other unfounded discriminatory motivations. The appropriate and principled 
restrictions placed upon the operation of magistrates’ courts may therefore stand in opposition to 
the more ad hoc, unconventional and pragmatic way that referral and local justice panels operate. 
There are clear areas of discord in creating and reconciling separate tiers or forums for the delivery 
of summary justice. It raises the issue of how diversionary approaches function at different levels 
and in different forums of summary justice and in what circumstances diversion from the judicial 
system is appropriate. While justice panels operate as a form of diversion from the formal court 
process, thereby preventing offenders from receiving a criminal record for what are often minor 
criminal offences, the use of such diversionary measures may also mean that an individual could 
subsequently appear in the magistrates’ court having good character (no criminal record) when they 
have been repeatedly engaging in criminal or sub-criminal (anti-social) behaviour in their community 
for months or potentially years previously. Diversion will not always be appropriate and greater 
discussion needs to be had about the circumstances where, even though offences are technically 
minor in nature, the use of informal resolution panels is not appropriate. This is an issue that has 
received particular attention in the context of the use of out of court disposals such as FPNs, where 
the increased use of these disposals may undermine the court of first response, and is also 
inappropriate as a sanction for certain criminal offences. Much of the government’s emphasis on the 
creation of NJPs has been as a way of tackling anti-social behaviour (ASB) more efficiently and 
effectively. Many cases of ASB concern repeated acts of nuisance behaviour (often coupled with 
aggressive attitudes towards neighbours) over a protracted period of time, and which are frequently 
perpetrated by a small number of individuals in specific neighbourhoods. To what extent NJPs are 
the appropriate forum for dealing effectively with the effects of this type of cumulative criminal or 
sub-criminal behaviour is similarly a matter of contention. 
Moreover, in magistrates’ courts, justices carry responsibility for the preservation and protection of 
the rights of individuals who appear before them including with regard to young people and children 
under the Children and Young Persons Act 2008, which requires magistrates to explain their 
judgments more fully to these categories of defendants. It will be important to ensure that locally 
developed and administered justice panels maintain similar protections for the rights of those (both 
adult and youth) who are brought before them in order that they are seen to be accountable and 
transparent in their approach to cases. The parents of young people may well put their children at 
risk of not receiving help and support from welfare services in their desire to avoid their children 
receiving a criminal record, or in their desire to appease the neighbours that they live alongside. 
Thus, greater thought needs to be given to the reconciliation of the creation of justice panels as an 
adjunct to the existing court system. 
Lay justice involvement in the work of the NJPs, particularly through chairing meetings, would 
facilitate an important oversight function to ensure that the process is fair to both the victim and 
offender; the rights of the offenders are properly protected; the solutions are fair and proportionate 
and correct decisions are made about whether the offender should be processed through the court 
system (in the same way that the magistrates’ court commits to the Crown Court) rather than dealt 
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with outside of it. The possibility of magistrates providing an oversight and accountability 
mechanism in the operation of NJPs, in a similar way to how they could provide (at least) 
retrospective scrutiny for out of court disposals, would be the most appropriate form of involvement 
that they could undertake. Neighbourhood Justice Panels are an important criminal justice 
innovation with a realistic prospect of reducing resource demands on the police as well as 
potentially impacting upon rates of recidivism, particularly for low level repeat offenders.135 By 
expanding the remit of NJPs to include referrals from the court, this would further reduce the 
pressures on the limited resources of the criminal justice system and result in a more balanced 
approach to offenders and victims. 
 
SENTENCING 
The extension of magistrates’ sentencing jurisdiction has been an aspect of the discussion on 
magisterial powers which has attracted political and judicial attention for some time. In addition, 
there is the potential for the remit of magistrates’ work to be extended to sentencing supervision as 
well as magistrates’ routine participation in other forums such as professional/disciplinary 
committees. There are both advantages and limitations to the broader incorporation of these areas 
into magisterial functions, which are examined in the pages that follow. 
 
Sentencing jurisdiction 
In 2001, the Auld Report acknowledged the existence of suggestions for a general increase (or 
decrease) in summary jurisdiction but concluded that there was ‘no wide or well-based support for a 
change in the general limit.’136 Under the last Labour administration, however, magistrates 
sentencing jurisdiction was in fact extended up to 12 months for a single offence by the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.137 One of the main reasons for this reform was a cost based rationale premised 
upon the supposed financial implications of the magistrates’ courts hearing more cases rather than 
referring them to Crown Court. Yet this part of the Act has never been implemented: powers 
extending magistrates’ jurisdiction remain on the statute book despite an unsuccessful attempt in 
2011 by the then Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, to repeal the powers through provisions in the 
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill.138 The powers could therefore be revisited 
without future parliamentary debate. Indeed, there remains significant political and magisterial 
support for the extension of magistrates’ sentencing jurisdiction which, it has been argued, would 
considerably reduce the number of offences that presently go to Crown Court, and would in turn 
substantially decrease the costs to the criminal justice system and the number of judges required 
over time.139 However, if increased (financial) efficiency in magistrates’ courts is the primary 
objective of current proposals for reform, a clear issue for consideration ought to be the relative cost 
of magistrates and DJs. Simply increasing magistrates’ sentencing jurisdiction overlooks addressing 
wider issues that significantly impact upon the cost of court business. 
For example, a related issue is why some 40 per cent of defendants who are convicted in the 
magistrates’ court, are sent to Crown Court for sentence and yet receive no more than a six month 
custodial sentence. A primary objective of the government’s review of the role of magistrates has 
been to address this aspect of sentencing. According to the Ministry of Justice, these types of 
sentences could have been passed by magistrates who ‘have the skills, capability and powers to deal 
with most of these cases’ and in courts ‘which are closer to the affected communities, and where 
the cost of a typical sitting day is significantly cheaper’.140 A simple corollary of this observation is 
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that magistrates are not using the powers available to them appropriately. However, these 
sentencing outcomes might also be explained by a number of other factors. For example, there can 
be a substantive difference in judicial perception of cases between magistrates and Crown Court 
judges.141 When magistrates hear a case at the most serious end of the sentencing range, they 
often send the case to Crown Court where judges are likely to view the case as amongst the least 
serious kind that they hear, and so in turn they may pass sentence at the lower end of the scale. 
Indeed, magistrates report that cases in which they have declined jurisdiction (either way offences), 
which would have been within or just slightly beyond their sentencing range, are periodically given 
community sentences in the Crown Court.142 In those instances where benches have sat on either 
way offences, the bench may decide, after listening to the evidence and the CPS view that, if 
convicted, the defendant would require a slightly longer sentence than 6 months’ custody, to send 
the case to Crown Court (with the associated delays for trial and additional costs incurred including 
legal aid). The outcome of the case at Crown Court may then be that the defendant has not received 
a prison sentence although at the either way point it appeared obvious to the bench from the 
evidence produced by the CPS as well as the prosecutors’ view, that it could not be dealt with by the 
magistrates’ court.143 
Another possible factor in accounting for lower (or comparable) sentences in the Crown Court may 
be that under previous guidance, the magistrates’ court had to assume for the purposes of 
determining mode of trial (for either way offences), that the prosecution’s version of the facts was 
correct, so that magistrates would cater for ‘worst case scenario’.144 It follows that cases which are 
considered on the basis of ‘worst case scenario’ may prima facie appear more serious when 
compared with the same case in which the judge is able to hear full defence arguments. New 
guidelines which came into force on 11 June 2012 however, bring a change in emphasis to the way in 
which magistrates approach assessing the strength of a case, moving away from taking the 
prosecution case at its highest and instead directing courts to take all aspects of the case into 
account.145 While it is not possible to fully anticipate how judges’ sentencing behaviour will change 
as a result of the new guidelines, it is possible that more sentences may be adjusted downwards 
than upwards, or vice versa, which will result in changes in the cost of sentencing. 
To what extent an increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers would correspond to an increase in 
the use of custody is also difficult to determine. Opponents have suggested that the considerable 
increase in the use of custody for female offenders over the last decade, for example, provides 
evidence of punitive judicial attitudes and a greater willingness to incarcerate offenders, particularly 
in low-level non-violent property related cases such as shoplifting.146 On the other hand, 
magistrates have argued that they are, on the whole, highly circumspect when imposing a custodial 
sentence, and rarely pass sentence for the maximum 26 weeks available to them.147 While the 
inefficacy of short prison sentences in reducing rates of recidivism, together with their economic 
shortcomings, has attracted significant attention in recent years,148 it does not necessarily follow 
however that sentencing limits should be increased in magistrates’ courts in order to refocus 
attention upon cases which ought to attract more significant periods of custody. Given the potential 
for increased sentencing powers to substantially enlarge prison numbers, any such reforms need to 
be carefully considered. The introduction of new licence and supervision measures for offenders 
serving short custodial sentences in the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 includes a new role and 
powers for magistrates to deal with offenders who breach the conditions of their supervision. Courts 
have powers to deal with those who fail to comply with their supervision conditions, including being 
able to commit an offender to custody for up to 14 days. It will be important first to observe the 
effect of these changes before any reform of sentencing powers is undertaken.149 Instead, a more 
useful way forward would be to ameliorate arrangements around sentence supervision. 
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Sentence supervision 
Both nationally and internationally, there has been increasing interest in the value of sentence 
supervision, and its potential impact upon sentence compliance and offender recidivism.150 When 
undertaken in appropriately targeted cases, evidence suggests that sentence supervision can help to 
reduce breaches and promote desistance from crime.151 The process of sentence supervision 
provides opportunities for the defendant to discuss with a magistrate/judge their progress on an 
order, exploring why they are doing well or poorly. Studies that have examined this aspect of 
sentencing review have found that this form of supervision can enhance procedural justice, resulting 
in offenders feeling that they have been treated fairly, which in turn leads to greater compliance 
with court orders and legal requirements.152 While other professionals could fulfil this supervisory 
role, research continues to support the conclusion that judicial supervision produces the most 
significant improvements in outcomes. 
Sentencer supervision of community orders is an area in which magistrates’ functions could 
judiciously be extended: the introduction of regular court reviews incorporating monitoring and 
supervision of offenders’ progress would enable a single magistrate within the court to track repeat 
offenders through the sentencing process. There is clear constructive value in magistrates playing a 
greater role in reviewing community orders, especially in view of evidence which suggests that a 
consistent relationship between defendant and sentence supervisor is the key to effective 
monitoring.153 Rather than relying upon the periodic reports of probation officers to assess the 
progress of an offender, a regular programme of in-court judicial sentence supervision would 
facilitate the provision of more detailed information to magistrates about the offender’s compliance 
with the conditions of their community order. By insisting on regular and rigorous compliance 
monitoring, the justice system can improve the accountability of offenders. It can also improve the 
accountability of service providers by requiring regular reports on their work with offenders. 
At present, sentence supervision is predominantly limited to drug rehabilitation requirements (DRRs) 
and it also operates in a small number of courts which have made use of specific provisions in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. The introduction of powers to provide for court review of community 
orders was contained in section 178 of the 2003 Act. On the face of it, section 178 powers appeared 
to signal an opportunity for courts to systematically adopt processes of review of offender 
compliance. The provisions permit powers to be granted to certain courts by the Secretary of State 
to enable the judiciary to make an order allowing or requiring a court to review the progress of an 
offender under a community order. This involves the offender returning to court at each review to 
discuss their progress with the judge/magistrate. Under section 178, the court also has the power to 
attach or remove a review provision from a community order, and regulate the timing of reviews. 
This has been found to work particularly well when the same member of the judiciary who passed 
sentence conducts the review.154 Yet section 178 powers have not been widely implemented, 
meaning that in the majority of courts, there is no provision for regular review of offenders subject 
to community supervision.155 There are a few notable exceptions to this practice however. Sefton 
Magistrates’ Court, for example, utilises an innovative community sentence scheme which 
incorporates court reviews of community orders for medium to high risk offenders who have poor 
compliance histories with probation. Outcomes to date have been very positive, with police 
reporting a 66 per cent reduction in the arrest rate for that offender group. 
It is, however, clearly not appropriate for all community orders to be subject to review. The 
widespread use of such powers would likely come with some associated costs (including 
requirements for the availability of magistrates to hear the reviews), although it is worth noting that 
in those courts where sentence supervision has already been deployed, it has been undertaken on 
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the initiative of local agencies and has utilised resources already available in the local area, thus 
central funding has not been required.156 Where sentence supervision is targeted appropriately at 
those offenders who are at high-risk of reoffending and are most likely to require such monitoring 
processes, there are many cases that would benefit from the judicial oversight that these powers 
permit. An important step towards achieving this would be the repeal of section 178 powers to 
enable magistrates to routinely review appropriate cases. 
More broadly, there are other areas of criminal justice in which magistrates’ responsibilities could 
usefully be extended to incorporate a greater oversight function. For example, an often neglected 
but extremely valuable institution that would benefit from more routine involvement of magistrates, 
is Independent Monitoring Boards (IMBs). Every prison has an affiliated IMB, which usually meets on 
a monthly basis.157 Magistrates have historically played a significant role in the oversight of prisons 
and in IMBs, although this role has been reduced as magistrates are no longer permitted to monitor 
their local prison: ‘monitoring’ was held to be incompatible with their role in sentencing offenders 
for breaches of disciplinary procedures.158 Moreover, it is District Judges who hear cases of serious 
prison indiscipline (adjudications). The fragmentation of the criminal justice through payment by 
results (PBR) models and the increasing role of police in the management of offenders,159 means 
that there is greater need than before for transparency and accountability in the delivery of justice. 
The routine participation of magistrates in IMBs could be an important step in creating more 
substantive oversight of offender ‘management’ services especially those which have been 
‘contracted out’ to private sector agencies.160 Magistrates’ routine participation in IMBs would go 
some way to establishing an improved system of checks and balances and a thus a better 
mechanism for the oversight of the ‘management’ of offenders in a criminal justice system 
dominated by processes of marketisation and managerialism.161 There also seems no reason why 
magistrates’ responsibilities could not be extended to permit them to sit alongside DJs on 
adjudications. 
There are numerous other contexts in which magistrates’ competences might usefully be deployed. 
While there is no role for magistrates as there used to be on the old police authorities, magistrates 
could sit regularly on other disciplinary tribunals such as those of the legal professions (The Bar 
Council and the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal), which a number of magistrates are already involved 
in. They could also be productive in working with the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC). 
Independent panels could, for example, take a lay review of cases and provide a first sift and 
evaluation of applications. Given the reduction in magistrates’ court business as a result of the use of 
out of court disposals, increased use of DJs,162 and the implications of the one-magistrate model for 
regulatory cases, it is important to think creatively and broadly about how best to strengthen the 
role of magistrates. This will, moreover, help to buttress the role of magistrates in summary justice, 
which is essential at a time when Her Majesty’s Court and Tribunals Service faces a requirement to 
cut its budget by 37.8 per cent between 2012 and 2016. Magistrates’ functions must, therefore, be 
seen to be integral to the delivery of effective summary justice, while offering value for money. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Almost two decades ago, Penny Darbyshire published a cautionary observation on the future of lay 
justice when she warned that the importance and value of summary proceedings had become 
widely ignored.163 Unfortunately, the intervening years have borne witness to a broad range of 
policy decisions and reforms to the system of summary justice which have yet further emasculated 
magistrates’ authority and reduced their ability to deliver local justice. The Ministry of Justice has 
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recently acknowledged the detrimental effects of some of these changes, noting that: ‘Falling 
workload, and the past abuse of out of court disposals has contributed to a feeling amongst some 
magistrates that their position within the criminal justice system is under threat’.164 Yet 
magistrates’ disaffection is a product of a much wider range of processes, policy reforms and 
statutory changes that, collectively, have served to systematically undermine the lay magistracy’s 
role in summary justice over a number of decades. Interestingly, in response to those who foresee 
the impending demise of the lay magistracy, the Ministry of Justice has been unequivocal in stating 
that: ‘This Government takes a very different view. We are clear that the magistracy have a vital role 
to play in the courtroom, and that, more than that, they shall increasingly play a vital role in modern 
society by strengthening the links between courts and the communities they serve.’165 There 
appears to be, then, some grounds for optimism. 
Nonetheless, it is evident that the role of magistrates must evolve to remain relevant and 
sustainable, and to be able to continue to provide its ‘different brand of justice’.166 The 
government’s plans for reform do indeed identify a number of salient areas in which magistrates’ 
powers could usefully be extended. Magistrates could play an important strategic role in scrutinising 
out of court disposals and in helping to better promulgate the statutory guidance on their use to 
ensure accountability, consistency and compliance with sentencing guidelines. Moreover, the formal 
introduction of a statutory oversight mechanism at magistrates’ court level for the administration of 
cautions (and potentially other summary penalties), would be an appropriate judicial forum in which 
to ensure that these disposals are issued in accordance with the law. Similarly, lay justice 
involvement in the work of NJPs would facilitate an important oversight and accountability 
mechanism. The development of NJPs should not be viewed as a threat to the lay magistracy but 
instead as a new adjunct to summary justice that could help to both enhance and bridge the gap 
between communities and the judicial system. 
Magistrates’ strategic value in our democratic system of justice ought to be reaffirmed, and the 
Coalition government has made some positive steps in this direction. A new All Party Parliamentary 
Working Group has been set up on the lay magistracy, and the Chairman of the Magistrates’ 
Association has recently reported that there is ‘an atmosphere [among policy-makers] to move these 
proposals further’.167 However, the government’s plans for further reform need to be situated 
within their wider policy context. Without doubt, there remains a policy trajectory in pursuit of 
efficiency savings premised upon reducing magistrate numbers and closing local courts.168 
Government reforms comprehensively fail to acknowledge the continuing impact of these changes 
upon the principle of local justice but also the clear irreconcilability of this policy position with 
proposals to strengthen the role of magistrates. It is this substantive disjuncture between 
(promising) government pronouncements to ‘strengthen’ the role of magistrates, and the failure to 
acknowledge these fundamental tensions, which is of greatest concern. This situation has led some 
to question whether there is an overarching, tacit agenda aimed at gradually replacing the lay 
magistracy.169 This is unlikely, and the more feasible explanation is that there has been a lack of 
comprehension about the collective impact of the situation as a whole, upon local, summary justice. 
In order to safeguard the involvement of lay magistrates in summary justice, a recent report has 
called for the recruitment of 10,000 new magistrates.170 At a time of economic austerity, the 
resourcing and financial implications of this are not practically viable and the better way forward is 
to reinforce the status of magistrates in summary justice, and to bolster and consolidate 
magistrates’ functions by expanding their role into other contexts. Cost savings can be achieved 
without reducing the numbers of magistrates and local courts still further. This requires that greater 
attention be paid to the relative costs of DJs and lay magistrates, including DJs’ increased use of 
23 
 
custody. Furthermore, magistrates can offer better ‘value for money’ through the expansion of their 
responsibilities into other domains, such as increased sentence supervision as well as their 
participation in IMBs, disciplinary tribunals and the CCRC. If magistrates’ roles are not revised, they 
risk becoming displaced by DJs and the increasingly powerful Justices’ Clerks. This was essentially the 
experience of lay justices in New Zealand, where the work of JPs is now largely confined to the 
witnessing of documents. Although there was no formal decision to downgrade their functions, the 
increasing professionalisation of summary justice as a result of the creation of community 
magistrates in New Zealand (whose work substantially mirrors that of English and Welsh DJs since 
they do not sit with legally-qualified clerks) simply displaced JPs as these other professionals became 
more numerous. 171 Securing the continued existence of the lay magistracy is important for the 
democratic legitimacy of the criminal justice system but also, through broadening the scope of 
magistrates’ responsibilities, the administrative efficiency of justice will be enhanced. Yet when 
policy-makers fail to fully recognise the legacy of previous reforms to the function of the lay 
magistracy and where they do not acknowledge the wider context of constraints affecting 
magistrates’ courts, particularly the enormous decline in magistrate numbers together with 
continuing courthouse closures, they risk creating policy in a vacuum. As one magistrate observed in 
his response to the government’s consultation, policymakers are: ‘Ignoring the elephant in the 
(court)room.’172 
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